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Summary
This paper addresses the current concerns with inefficiency in the
primary, secondary, and higher educational system by seeking more
comprehensive social-efficiency criteria together with corresponding
operational measures. Also considered are the problems created by
inequity in the distribution of benefits of education among children and
college-age young adults in relation to the major criteria for and
measures of equity. One new result of this inquiry is the development
of the concepts necessary for achieving simultaneous improvements in
efficiency and equity, as well as ways to measure the trade-offs between
the two in education.
It is suggested that socially efficient, equitable, and hence
better, education has the potential for significant longer-run benefits
for growth and ir.prcvements ir. the quality of life in the broader society

Efficiency and Equity Criteria for Educational Budgeting and Finance
There are new and increased incentives for finding ways to improve
efficiency and equity in education. As costs rise, and all education
budgets grow tighter, there is an Increasing struggle to find resources
that can be put to more efficient uses to maintain quality and innova-
tion In education, while also assuring equitable access to all educa-
tion. This concern with inefficiency when resources are wasted and
with inequities such as continuing inequality of educational oppor-
tunity is intensified by the fact that new sources of inefficiency and
inequity are constantly being created by declining enrollments,
shifting job markets, slower growth, and inflation, all reflected in
the political climate.
Yet there are important payoffs from reducing these growing problems
with inefficiency and inequity. These gains include finding slack
resources that can be used to improve the quality of education and to
extend educational opportunity. Better education is an important end
in itself, but better education also has a strategic role in that it
can contribute to humane growth in the entire society.
One response is for education to ignore these problems. Another is
to take the position that any attempts to evaluate the efficiency or
benefits of educational programs run such dangers of using imperfect
measures or of ignoring some benefits, that it is better to keep the
criteria hidden and implicit. The suggestions made in this chapter
and in other parts of the book in offering partial criteria, however,
are not that measurement is essential to the successful application of
logical criteria. To oralt qualitative appraisals of potential benefits
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that cannot now be measured given the current state of the arts would
merely favor blind applications. Instead the criteria offered are more
like early warning systems, which, when used judiciously, are better
than doing nothing, which can perpetuate waste and inequity.
Inefficiency and inequity currently permeate much of primary, secon-
dary, and higher education. Buildings, administrative staff, and teachers
are underutilized in schools and colleges as enrollment declines, and this
creates numerous sources of inefficiency, waste, and lower productivity.
Another symptom of social inefficiency, or inefficiency from society's
point of view, occurs because many children are not learning the basics
of reading, writing, and mathematics which limits their capacities in
other subjects, their access to college, and their lifetime potential.
There are also problems with efficiency when in the face of system-wide
contraction, lower quality curricula with reduced enrollments become
very high cost and yet are preserved. A final example of social inef-
ficiency is seen in the opinion of most when the allocation of scarce
educational resources results in large surpluses of educational out-
comes that have limited practical, esthetic, or humanitarian uses, such
as costly PhD's in fields which are already very low-paid and
overcrowded, offering very limited job prospects.
A particularly important source of inequity, which is also endemic to
the system^ involves the distribution of the benefits of education among
pupils. One symptom is the wide differences in benefits traceable to
differences in expenditure per pupil among states, among school districts,
and within districts—differences in the order of five to one in most of
the states—that arise because of the differences in the wealth of the
-3-
parents and the neighborhood. These differences are known to purchase
teachers with more graduate training, more experience, and better verbal
skills, as well as better staff support for children in wealthier dis-
tricts, while denying educational opportunity to children born in poor
neighborhoods. This reduces the chances of the latter for access to
college, leads to greater inequity in the distribution of income later,
and to reduced chances for these children in life. There are also ine-
quities in the distribution of benefits among college-level students
which also have implications for the distribution of income and for
distributive justice in society.
Education's strategic role is due to the fact that there are three
kinds of returns later to education when it is efficient and equitable
that together comprise humane growth—an economic growth of earnings, a
growth of non-monetary returns, and a more equitable distribution of
income. The contribution education can make to the first component,
economic growth, has taken on increased interest in a world deeply con-
cerned about the slowdown in productivity growth and anxious to find
less energy intensive means of bringing new technology to bear on pro-
duction. The second, consisting of non-market, non-monetary returns to
education during leisure time hours is an important aspect of improve-
ment in the quality of human life. Finally, improvements in the equity
with which the benefits of education are distributed among pupils has
an important bearing on the equity with which both the monetary returns
and the non-monetary returns are distributed among these same persons
later in life, and hence on greater distributive justice.
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I. The Theme
The theme of this chapter, and of this book, illustrated in the
foregoing examples, is that improved social efficiency and equity in
the entire educational process will contribute to better education for
all, and through this to growing contributions to humane growth in the
society. Defined in this way, the educational process is not limited
to the classroom but includes the home, the neighborhood, and learning
on the job. While school and college budgets cannot control these
environments, there are elements within them that can be influenced and
that need to be included in the planning process if the budgeted acti-
vities are to be socially efficient. The goal of better education for
all, furthermore, refers to finding the best resource reallocations
that can be made toward this end under conditions of limited resources
—
that is, this and the following chapters consider possibilities for
improvement either of efficiency or of equity toward achieving the best
and most equitably distributed education possible under tight budgets.
The task of this chapter is to explain and to seek some improvement
in the criteria for achieving greater efficiency and equity in educa-
tion. Social efficiency and equity criteria are poorly defined, and
those criteria that have been operationalized are poorly understood,
and hence often not applied effectively. The problems however are
difficult, major ones of which are that often a wide enough agreement
does not exist among key leaders on what educational outcomes are most
desired. Whatever consensus does exist is often understated. There
also are not workable definitions, much less accurate measurement, of
some of the benefits of education.
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Both expenditure and tax-side decisions involve efficiency and
equity—both are part of financing education, and both are considered in
the chapters that follow. Budgeting decisions made at Federal, state,
or district levels each can be viewed as the source of finance from the
perspective of the next lower level of education. The educational sei^
vices provided also have a feedback effect on the financial resources
that can be raised. Analyzing the expenditure decisions in the budget
as well as the traditional tax side decisions is not only in line with
the more recent trends in research in public finance, but it is also in
line with the growth in popular concern with the efficiency (and equity)
with which resources are used. Each and every education budget decision
within a local school, college, state, or nation,- in practice, impli-
citly involves the potential benefits, or effects, in relation to the
costs. Furthermore, this budget decision can be regarded as the educa-
tional plan for the following year—that is, educational planning imple-
mented within shorter run situations, especially if there is an appro-
priate integration between educational planning and the budget. Regarded
in this way, financing education deals with the heart of the process of
securing efficiency and equity in the use of resources as well as in
their acquisition.
II. Criteria for Social Efficiency and Equity
Pareto efficiency is defined as improvements in how resources are
used to embody knowledge, skills, and values in persons ("production effi-
ciency"), or to provide education in the kinds and amounts that society
needs ("exchange efficiency") in such a way that some are made better-
2
off, but no one is made worse-off. Equity, in contrast, deals with a
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different question—the question of the justice with which the benefits
of education, or the tax or other burdens, are distributed. The achieve-
ment of equity is defined in the purest sense as involving a redistri-
bution of resources where some gain and some lose. That is, if all
possible improvements in efficiency have been made so that there are no
slack resources available for use, to improve equity would require a
redistribution of educational benefits (or of tax burdens) that make
some better off, but some worse off, albeit in the interest of greater
distributive justice.
Efficiency and Equity in Education
Efficiency typically means a potential for increases in the desired
outcomes of education without increases in the physical quantities of
resources used. Efficiency does not mean "speed up," or increases in
the number of pupils per teacher without additional teacher compen-
sation, for such a "speed-up" leaves the teacher worse-off. Efficiency
does mean maintaining all outcomes of education while saving costs,
perhaps through the application of new knowledge or technology to the
learning process—the released resources can be used to make some
pupil, teacher, or taxpayer better off, and no one need be worse-off.
Budget changes that redistribute educational benefits among young
people involve interpersonal comparisons of the amount of satisfaction
gained by some In relation to the amount lost by others before a judg-
ment can be made about whether or not social welfare has been increased.
Although typical of most practical situations, these equity judgments
lie beyond the realm of pure economics—the basis of the equity judgment
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lies instead in philosophy, ethics, and to some extent in legal
interpretations
.
Combining Efficiency and Equity
Efficiency and equity are regarded by many as in conflict—that is,
the trade-off for an increase in equity is a loss in efficiency.
Put the other way around, the trade-off for increasing the efficiency
with which pupils learn is restricted access to educational programs.
Such trade-offs do exist, of course, and are an important feature of
most educational systems of the world. Nevertheless, there are situa-
tions in which both improvements in the social efficiency of education,
and improvements in distributive justice, can be made simultaneously.
This represents a very important situation, for improvements can be made
in both without making anybody worse-off in any absolute sense. Less
political opposition to such changes can be expected, and we can also be
more certain that such changes are moves toward a truly better solution.
We therefore will devote considerable attention to defining criteria to
guide budget (and tax) decisions toward finding resource reallocation
moves of this type.
To summarize this theme. Figure 1 provides a useful frame of
reference for relating contributions here and elsewhere on efficiency or
equity to the common goal of the best and most equitable distribution of
educational benefits attainable under tight budgets. In Figure 1, the
horizontal axis represents the benefits or lifetime satisfactions from
education received by individual A, whereas the vertical axis represents
the lifetime satisfactions from education received by individual 3.
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Moves toward better education for both are up the hill to the right that
is defined by contour lines W^W^^ and W.W . But movements toward better
education for both A and B are constrained by the limits imposed by the
real resources that are available—the efficiency frontier represented
by the line BB.
Individuals A and B are also typical of two groups, group A who may
be from a poor neighborhood and receives less benefits from education
3
than group B at the starting position, point Z (i.e.. A, < B„). The
objective is to use the slack resources that exist at point Z due to
social inefficiency in' such a way as budget and other planning decisions
are being made to improve the quality of education received both by A
and by B as well as the equity with which it is distributed. The goal
is the best and most equitably distributed education attainable within
the resources available which is at fJ, the point of constrained bliss.
^ t ,3 1-1 re Cine
Sacis tactions
from Education
B.
A's Lifetime
ii" Satisfactions
iJ/^ from Education
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Humane Growth Criteria . A move from Z to X increases efficiency
(no one is worse off), from X to fi increases equity (the benefits are
more equitably distributed), and a move from Z to ^ directly contributes
simultaneously to both efficiency and equity, leaving both A and B
better-off. We will refer to the latter as a move consistent with
humane growth—both within education and in the society at large—and
offer humane growth criteria that should be useful in finding moves of
this type in practical educational planning at primary, secondary, and
college levels. But first, what is wrong with changes in educational
planning and budgets designed exclusively to increase efficiency, or to
increase equity, taken separately?
The answer is nothing if they are so designed that the benefits
exceed the costs. Pure equity moves in educational finance reform such
as those from X to J^ in Figure 1 redistribute in a way that hurts some-
one, and therefore generate opposition. A group containing individuals
like individual B in Figure 1 who is receiving a better education to
start with at point X is left worse-off. Those involved with group B
will complain, and others can be expected to join their cause, arguing
that the quality education received by this group is being sacrificed
for something inferior at n. The goal of greater distributive justice
in this case is impeded in its accomplishment by the inability to be
sure that the gains to group A exceed the damage to group B. As tight
national, state, and institutional budgets for education are affected
by slower growth, improvements in equity and access cannot be financed
with new resources and must increasingly be financed by internal budget
reallocations like X to f^ that generate conflict and thereby fore-doom
many educational finance reform efforts.
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Pure efficiency moves alone also have pitfalls. They can help to
locate and use slack resources, but if done only for an elitist few,
the cost is greater relative inequity for others. For example, an effi-
ciency move in Figure 1 such as that from Z to X uses slack resources
to improve B's benefits. But after the change is implemented there is
even more inequality of educational opportunity and inequity than had
existed before.
To avoid these dilemmas, humane growth criteria which combine both
efficiency and equity considerations are proposed. These criteria are
to be used to seek out those reallocations of resources when making"
short and longer run budget decisions that either (1) improve effi-
ciency without reducing equity
,
or (2) increase equity without reducing
efficiency . Both of these criteria combine improvements in efficiency
with improvements in equity such as those from Z to J2 in Figure 1.
Full application of these humane growth criteria, of course, somewhat
overrestricts the decision space. In many practical situations, there
will be at least some adverse side effects on either efficiency or
equity. But the literature to date has tended to emphasize the conflict
and trade-offs between efficiency and equity so heavily that perhaps a
more vigorous effort is justified to find those situations where
simultaneous improvements in both can be made. Further operational
concepts and measures of efficiency, equity, and humane growth are
needed for the practical application of these criteria and will be con-
sidered below.
The resources necessary for better education can come from growth
in the real financial resources available to education—this is equiva-
lent to a shift outward in the constraint (line BB in Figure 1). But
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these additional new real resources are increasingly less available.
Instead, educational planners often must allow inflation to act as a
cross-the-board tax on the units they administer, and then to carefully
distribute nominal increments to a few selected productive programs. In
this sense, most budgeting and educational planning is really internal
reallocation. Since this has become so common, a premium is placed on
knowing where to "allow" budgets to be eroded due to inefficiency, and
on knowing where the potential for improvements in efficiency is greatest,
III. Efficiency Criteria
Efficiency has two major aspects: production efficiency which
refers to the efficiency with which inputs of time and resources are
combined in the educational process to secure desired outcomes, and
exchange efficiency which refers to the efficiency with which appropriate
educational outcomes are matched with the citizens' educational needs.
Production Efficiency; Technical, Price, and
Economic Efficiency Defined
Production efficiency is developed in Figure 2a with two inputs,
and in Figure 2b with two outputs, based on a simplified educational
4production function. For the two-input case, isoquant Q-. Q- illu-
strates combinations of student time and teacher time used to produce
one unit of educational output. This trade-off along QqQq, with
possible improvements in the technical efficiency with which student
time is used (Z to C) is also illustrated in the chapter by Thomas et.
al. where more individualized instruction is found to elicit more stu-
dent "time on task."
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Figure 2a. Two Inputs Figure 2b . Two Outputs
The isoquant in Figure 2a is a unit isoquant (with the index of output
and all inputs divided by the output index), so that all output dots
above Q^ Q^ are less efficient production points. Technical efficiency
exists when from point Z, any point down on Q_ Q- is reached. This
requires a reallocation of available resources in such a way that tech-
nical efficiency is maximized, such as when teacher verbal skills are
used to explain things clearly. Price efficiency involves considering
the relative prices of the resources used, as opposed to technical
efficiency which ignores the costs. In this illustration, the costs
of teacher-time in terms of the salaries required to hire teachers with
the necessary skills, as well as the costs of student-time (as measured
by foregone earnings) must be brought together with production function
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information in a cost-effectiveness analysis before the most price-
efficient combination of these resources is found. A movement from Z to
B constitutes an improvement in technical efficiency; a movement from B
to 5 constitutes an improvement in price efficiency; and only at 6
which combines both, is full economic efficiency achieved.
Production efficiency in education also involves the choice of
optimum outputs, among various alternatives, as illustrated in Figure
2b. There is more than one output in education at both the intermediate
and final-good levels, with the result that there is both the difficulty
and the need to ascertain society's output goals and the weight to be
assigned to each. Within higher education, for example, there are
instruction, research, and public service; at all levels there are
breakdowns by curricular areas and by cognitive and non-cognitive out-
comes, as well as the subdivisions of each, that are the focus of educa-
tional evaluators. The intermediate instructional outcomes such as stu-
dent achievement contribute to the ultimate outcomes (or benefits) such
as lifetime earnings and non-monetary returns that are the primary ulti-
mate concern of individuals and of the society.
Figure 2b illustrates a choice in the use of resources, with inef-
ficient points below the production frontier such as point Z, so that a
movement from point Z to point D constitutes achievement of technical
efficiency . There is no pure price efficiency since outputs are not
sold for a price on the market, but there is an analogous concept that
can be called allocatlve efficiency . It relates to the attainment of
that mix of educational goals given in this case by a benificent educa-
tional administrator's utility function W^W^, representing his best effort
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to ascertain society's true goals. These goals are normally not made
very explicit, which limits the possibilities for cost-effectiveness,
but nevertheless a movement from point D to point 6_ constitutes an
improvement in allocative efficiency. To make such moves requires that
the educational policy maker's goals, and also society's goals as repre-
sented through school boards, legislatures. Congress, and public opinion
polling be ascertained with some care.
Cost effectiveness decisions such as the four types illustrated in
Figures 2a and 2b are made every day by vice chancellor's for academic
affairs, department heads, school district superintendents, and school
principals. But the cost effectiveness analysis that is done is nor-
mally implicit rather than -explicit, and it normally does not go by
such a formal name. More explicit formal attempts at cost effective-
ness analysis and at goal programming are considered by Richard Rossmiller
and Elchanan Cohn later in this book. Effective informal use of the
framework above, together with the production function information that
underlies it, does require that useful cost effectiveness analysis
depends heavily on making an effort in each educational institution and
state to study the costs in relation to the outcomes. It also would
encourage at least trying to place socially acceptable weights on the
various immediate and ultimate educational outcomes.
Exchange Efficiency: Technical, Allocative
and Economic Efficiency Defined
Exchange efficiency, in contrast to production efficiency, deals
with the exchange or delivery of a given amount of educational services
to families. It involves changes in the structure of the educational
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program, or numbers of students in each field, until there is a better
fit to the needs of students and of the society. The total return
possible from education as was given by the level of line BB in Figure
1 depend in part upon how efficiently the outcomes of the educational
system are designed to meet true individual and social needs.
Human capital skills cannot be exchanged among students since
human capital is embodied in individuals. But as new skills and new
technology are embodied in persons, in a putty-clay fashion, there is
great potential for increasing exchange efficiency in education.
Exchange efficiency can be improved, meeting private and social needs
more accurately, as students are allocated efficiently among classes and
institutions, as special education programs try to match programs with
needs and abilities, and as informed choice of institutions and majors
is exercised by college students. Exchange efficiency is sometimes
impeded by budgeting and financing decisions such as those that overly
limit resources in medicine and other fields, partially in response to
debatable studies suggesting that a surplus is being trained without
explicit reference to the expected future returns in relation to the
costs. Similarly, if exchange inefficiency is to be reduced, local
schools should train more apprentices for entry into crafts such as
plumbing where craftsmen are in short supply and unions try to limit
entry. Exchange inefficiency is also evident when widely different
monetary rates of return to education are found in different college-
related occupations.
On the other hand, the development of community colleges and of
the Federal Basic Economic Opportunity Grant programs have encouraged
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exchange efficiency (in addition to equity) by widening the range of
options available for student choice, both among curricula and among
institutions. Students are reasonably knowledgeable about their longer
run best interests, but unreasonable barriers to entry continue to per-
sist in some curricula. These barriers are enforced by overly restric-
tive budget limits and other types of quotas, even where returns are
high in relation to the costs, coupled with over-enrollment and budgets
adequate to support low entrance standards in less needed fields, pro-
moting social inefficiency.
An Efficiency Criteria Hierarchy
Overall efficiency criteria are essential to determine if each prac-
tical budget decision in the financing of education will or will not
improve economic efficiency. The following efficiency criteria
hierarchy is suggested, ranked from the lowest efficiency criterion to
the highest. Each stage is a partial criterion, so only by going the
full distance to include some qualitative evaluation of all of the
benefits and their relative weights can full social efficiency be
attained.
1. Accountability Tests . Lower level efficiency criteria consist
of normal financial accounting controls and accountability checks on
whether processes that are financed are being performed by the unit. If
the services are not delivered, even basic efficiency is unlikely to be
achieved. But these criteria alone fail to analyze the production-
effectiveness of what is done, much less analyze whether it is cost
effective. Competency testing goes somewhat farther in that it tries
to measure at least some outputs, rather than only inputs.
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2. Production Function Analysis. This is an effort to try to
determine what is effective in producing the desired educational
outcomes. It can range from trial and error (what works) to the produc-
tion function relationships of the types discussed by Thomas et. al.,
Benson, Rossmiller, and used in Cohn's model in chapters that follow.
Such knowledge of what does and what does not contribute to learning
helps schools and colleges to be efficient by developing productive
activities and avoiding those that are unproductive. Although
necessary for efficiency, action using these relationships from produc-
tion function studies still is not sufficient to attain the highest
level of economic efficiency, since the latter also requires con-
sideration of the costs of the inputs involved and the relative value
of the outputs.
3. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis . Costs are considered in relation
to the quantities of output obtained. Cost-effectiveness analysis uses
the prices of the inputs but in the past some of the costs have been
omitted, such as the cost of student time. Frequently, only intermediate
outputs such as instructional units are analyzed, whereas longer run
outcomes such as the current and future demands for graduates in the
field are ignored. However, even with these limitations, if the deci-
sion maker's goals are well conceived, cost-effectiveness ratios can be
helpful guides to Increased efficiency. One example might be the com-
parisons now being made by state agencies of the cost-effectiveness of
producing instructional units of comparable quality at different colle-
ges or schools within each state. With state-wide retrenchment, low
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quality curricula often lose enrollment first, losing the advantages of
scale, and become very high cost per student.
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis . Costs are considered in relation to
the expected value of outputs, and either benefit/cost ratios, or rates
of return (which are a form of benefit/cost ratios) are calculated. The
main problem is that as developed thus far, the measurement of expected
future benefits is usually limited to monetary earnings because they
are the more easily measurable part, although full costs are normally
considered. There is also the need to predict expected future job
market trends and their implications for rates of return so as not to
rely too heavily on the past, although there is some evidence that the
returns expected by students at least in the medium term future and the
expected rates of return based on these are reasonably accurate.
Differences in the actual monetary rates of return to education over
time, by type of occupation, and by type of institution do tend to
persist however, and are suggestive, as are the expected rates of return
that anticipate major trends of low rate of return and high rate of
return fields at different types of institutions. These differences
are developed further in the chapter by McHahon and Wagner,
One criterion is to suggest that where expected rates of return are
high in relation to alternatives there is a good investment opportunity,
assuming that all of the nonmonetary returns and social benefits can
reasonably be assumed to be positive, or at least zero. A second cri-
terion is to attempt to adjust the monetary rates of return by
including, judgmentally, specific non-monetary private returns of such
-19-
types as those surveyed by Robert Michael. They should in principle be
included in the final qualitative judgment made about total benefits.
5. Cost-Benefit Analysis with Social Benefits Included . The
highest level efficiency criterion from the point of view of society
as a whole must consider the full social costs as well as the full
expected benefits to society when calculating more comprehensive rates
of return or other benefit cost ratios. The student needs to think
only about the private benefits and private costs to himself and his
family in making his investment decision. Educational administrators,
and school boards, boards of higher education, and legislative bodies
whose responsibility is to think about all persons in their jurisdiction
should consider the full benefits, including the benefits of research to
future generations and the spillover benefits from education to society.
A partly-social benefit that has become more pertinent recently due to
the widespread concern with the showdown in economic growth is the
larger potential contribution education could make to economic growth
if curricula were organized more efficiently to this end. In Japan and
Russia, for example, much more high school science and math is
required, more college students are trained in areas related to economic
productivity such as engineering and science, there are higher literacy
rates, and lower drop out rates. Another important social benefit was
cited by Thomas Jefferson who urged public support by the State of
Virginia for public education as the key to securing effective indivi-
dual participation in the democratic process and hence as the key to
the preservation of our freedoms. These types of social benefits are
-20-
undoubtedly the hardest kind to measure, but they can nevertheless be
observed and are real.
Use of Social Efficiency Criteria
Detailed measurement is not essential to the successful application
of these efficiency criteria. They are continually being applied impli-
citly at all levels, without much measurement or use of their formal
names, as decisions are made—it is only that increasingly more conscious
consideration of the costs in relation to effectiveness and longer run
benefits only can help to improve efficiency. The use of the criteria,
with or without formal measurement, involves considering (a) effectiveness
in relation to cost, then (b) longer range monetary and psychic benefits
of the degree in relation to cost, and finally (c) qualitative judg-
ments that include social benefits to obtain full ultimate benefits in
relation to cost as a basis for decisions, all the while seeking to
avoid reducing equity.
Many indices of effectiveness are used by educational evaluators
that could become a part of cost-effectiveness tests by being related
to cost. The cost per instructional unit in the same discipline across
institutions is one common example. University departments also have
research outputs, which in experimental studies are conceived of in
terms of the cost per referred publication or weighted "research unit,"
Research effectiveness is evaluated internally by committees on program
evaluation, promotion committees, and research-support committees,
whose recommendations then are related to costs before final decisions
are made. There are in principle also "public service units" resulting
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from public service, a separate third output. Another commonly spe-
cified index of instructional effectiveness is a measure of the incre-
ments to scores on standard achievement tests covering basic skills,
science, social science, and humanities. When a sufficiently compre-
hensive index of effectiveness is specified, such as these test-score
increments, the cost-per-unit in principle can be estimated, and social
efficiency increased by gradually transfering resources from the less
cost-effective approaches to the more cost-effective ones.
By moving toward more comprehensive concepts of the longer run mone-
tary and psychic benefits of education, or "fxill earnings" used in
benefit-cost criteria, further improvements in social efficiency can be
achieved. This assumes that some estimate can be made of the value of
the psychic benefits, or that they are greater than zero, resulting in
an index that is more comprehensive than the index of effectiveness.
Then total rates of return can be estimated that do provide some guidance-
they still must be supplemented with medium term 3-5 year projections
and with qualitative judgments about the social benefits of each
program. The result is a higher order criterion for increasing social
efficiency by allowing those programs to gradually contract where the
expected adjusted total rates of return are lowest, and by allocating
more resources to the expansion of those programs where the expected
adjusted total rates of return are highest.
IV. Equity
The poor quality of the education and the poor results being
achieved in the urban ghettos and other poor neighborhoods in the
United States is a national and international disgrace. It leaves a
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heritage of costs and inequity for the future—overloading the welfare
system, filling up the jails, contributing to low productivity growth
in the U.S., and limiting the earning capacity and life chances of
many. There is an intergenerational transmission of these costs and
of inequity.
Concern with equity among all children at each age (child equity)
and with equity among taxpayers (tax equity) has dominated the litera-
ture in school finance, whereas the literature on financing post secon-
dary education has tended to be more specialized either on efficiency or
on equity. The attention given to efficiency and its combination with
equity in this book therefore represents a considerable departure.
Improvements in efficiency can be a source for financing improve-
ments in equity from internal sources, an important fact in this era
of tight budgets. Furthermore, some inequity is due to Inefficiency in
the schools in poor neighborhoods—how much is hard to say, but improve-
ments in the social efficiency of these schools would simultaneously
increase equity.
To suggest some of the problems, the persistence of child inequity
is suggested by indices of inequality (or dispersion) of expenditure per
pupil among schools and among districts—inequality so vast that expen-
diture as noted in Windham (1979, p. 81) was 23 times higher in rich
districts than in poor districts in Texas, Wyoming, and South Dakota,
for example, before the inflation of the late 1970's and 1980's widened
inqualities in these and other states. Inflation increases local pro-
perty values more in property rich districts, thus increasing local
property assessments, the inequality of local property tax receipts,
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and child inequity. Unless initiatives -are taken by state governors
and other key policy makers to support school finance reforms in
response to the strains of inflation, property taxpayer revolts are
another result.
In urban ghettos, the problems with child inequity have not been
overcome by Federal categorical programs such as Head Start, Title I, or
Community Development (housing) programs. Thus far these programs have
not been sufficiently effective in dealing with problems in urban ghet-
tos and poor neighborhoods, and poor educational results. There are
however successful experiments underway such as the one in District 13
(Beasley) of south Chicago which requires contracts with parents to see
that homework is completed, bedtimes are enforced, and TV time is
limited. The results are impressive, and consistent with the research
results reported by Benson in a later chapter who finds that poor
parents are just as concerned about their children and spend just as
much time guiding their children as higher SES parents. To relate
Benson's findings to improved child equity and school achievement,
need-based education grants to parents could require learning contracts
involving a parental commitment to see that homework is done (using
Benson's findings) while facilitating more parental involvement and
choice among schools as discussed by Schultz. The Federally-sponsored
842 equity studies are also significant, but have not yet led to
comprehensive state-level reforms. As yet no President or political
party has come forth with a comprehensive approach to the underlying
school efficiency and school financing problems troubling the low
income neighborhoods nationwide.
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In post-secondary education, the problems associated with child
inequity and tax inequity have eased somewhat in the United States, due
in part to the expansion of Community Colleges which improved access
and reduced the inequity for those who had previously been excluded.
Similarly, the careful calibration to financial need of the Federal
Basic Economic Opportunity Grants since the 1972 Act has been a signi-
ficant factor reducing inequity among young people. Colleges still
inherit problems caused by inequity in the financing of the common
schools, college-age students have a somewhat freer choice, even though
they are still heavily dependent on the income of their parents. In
the Hansen-Weisbrod (1969) study, the inequity on the tax side which
they also cite has been reduced somewhat as more states exempt food
from the state sales tax, as public institutions raise their tuition in
the high-cost high-return programs, and as those students in the latter
programs (such as medicine) make more extensive use of new student loan
programs. These equity features of the U.S. system of higher education
finance have not permeated Europe or other countries nearly so exten-
sively. Even though this book focuses primarily on U.S. education,
equity problems persist elsewhere. In the U.S., however, the child
equity problems appear to be considerably more acute than in Europe at
the primary and secondary level, with spillover effects on the colleges
and on society.
Types of Equity
Equity is defined as involving a redistribution of resources (or of
costs) designed to approach the community's philosophical and ethical
standards of fairness. This was previously illustrated in Figure 1 as
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a redistributi-ve move from point X to point Q, the latter representing
society's judgment of an ethical and equitable distribution of benefits
(or of costs) between A and B, and hence the point of constrained
bliss. Such redistributive moves can be designed to achieve either:
1. horizontal equity
,
generally held to require equal treatment
of equals (and accepted as having this meaning here), or
2. intergenerational equity, in-between horizontal and vertical
equity, and a case of considerable importance in education, or
3. vertical equity , requiring unequal treatment of unequals, in
ways to be discussed.
A fully equitable solution (such as at point f2) would require that
horizontal, intergenerational, and vertical equity be achieved. These
concepts of equity can be applied to equity among all children or young
adults in each age-bracket whether in school or not which we will refer
to as child equity . They can also be applied to equity among teachers,
administrators, and other staff which we will refer to as staff equity
,
or to equity among taxpayers or others who bear the costs of education
which we will refer to as tax equity . Staff equity is also important,
but it is not dealt with in this book because it raises different
issues of personnel administration, morale, and productivity, and dif-
ferent complementarities and trade-offs between equity and efficiency.
Horizontal Equity
The above definitions of horizontal and vertical equity are
standard, but stressing the distinction will make clear that some
measures of equity that are in use introduce elements of both. It is
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suggested here that the most practical operational measure of horizon-
tal equity is real current expenditure per child. This needs to be
defined further, and modified with considerations relating to inter-
generational equity, but the latter gets into the equalization of ulti-
mate outcomes and vertical equity criteria that follow. The initial
and probably most important criterion is that if there is equal real
current expenditure per pupil among groups of young persons with essen-
tially comparable abilities, there is horizontal equity. Measures of
the degree of inequity or inequality include the full range, restricted
range (95th to 5th percentile range), variance, coefficient of variation,
mean deviation, and the Gini coefficient. The Atkinson (1970) index
merits special attention since it is capable of weighting the ends of
the distribution to include vertical equity, and the bottom 10 percent
or so is of special political and practical interest.
Expenditures should be current expenditures, not including the more
erratic capital outlays. From the point of view of economic logic,
these expenditures should also include an element for the current cost
of capital, reflecting bond interest and other current imputed costs of
the capital invested in buildings. For measures of horizontal equity,
expenditure per child furthermore must be compared for like groups
—
groups with comparable proportions of disadvantaged pupils, or of high
ability pupils. Within or among educational systems, pure horizontal
equity tests would involve comparing expenditure per pupil in primary
schools with that in other primary schools, high schools with high
schools, comprehensive districts with comprehensive districts, college
discipline with college discipline, etc. The weights often applied to
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different pupils at different levels to reflect differences in per-
pupil costs involve, in part, a cost-benefit criterion but also a ver-
tical equity principle.
Measurement of horizontal equity using expenditure per pupil should
also, in principle, be in real terms to remove the effects of geographi-
cal price level differences, particularly in relation to teacher and
staff salaries which account for 70-80% of most educational costs.
Geographical differences in the cost-of-living affect the salaries that
it is necessary to pay to attract teachers of comparable quality. The
result would be toward equalization of the real resources purchased, and
hence the quality of education provided. This can be done by dividing
expenditures by a cost of education or cost-of-living index. Cost-of-
living indices are correlated with the prices of the other things
schools buy, and are now available for all states and, by relatively
simple extensions for counties and school districts in any state by
methods reported in McMahon and Melton (1978, 1981).
Operational measures for horizontal equity among taxpayers logically
focus on the tax rate paid by individuals, who ultimately pay all
taxes and are the ultimate object of any concern with equity, expressed
in relation to their ability-to-pay. The most basic operational cri-
terion for horizontal equity among taxpayers is equal tax rates for all
of those who are essentially equal with respect to their real income
and wealth. This basic criterion has been reinterpreted and limited in
many school finance laws to equal property tax rates across districts
as a measure of effort and tax equity. But this criterion ignores the
point that equity refers to people and not districts, and also ignores
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differences in income which are an important source of differences in
the ability-to-pay and in property tax rates. There is the further
problem that proportional tax rates when combined with typical
assessment procedures result in a regressive tax incidence, at least
unless combined with circuit breakers that exempt low income persons.
School districts are normally given real property as their legal tax
handle, but taxes are paid out of income and are ultimately paid by
individuals in relation to their properly measured ability-to-pay,
facts that when ignored result in horizontal inequity among individual
taxpayers.
Intergenerational Equity
When equity concepts are applied to the outcomes of education,
however, they go beyond equality of opportunity and horizontal equity
since student abilities and parental abilities-to-pay are in fact unequal.
Student abilities, parental education, and wealth all contribute to the
skills and knowledge accumulated, or to human capital formation from a
human capital perspective. These skills and knowledge, or the creden-
tials that measure and advertise them, contribute to higher earnings
later in the life-cycle of the student. An interesting alternative out-
come to be considered, therefore, is the expected lifetime "full
earnings" of the student, defined here as the student's earnings from
his labor plus his or her non-monetary returns from education during
leisure time hours. To achieve a degree of vertical equity among those
ultimate outcomes would be to seek to avoid burdening the children with
the "sins" of their parents—as does fiscal neutrality—that is, to
reduce the intergenerational transmission of inequality.
-29-
This choice situation is illustrated in Figure 3. Here children
with lower income parents (and/or with lower ability) are confined to
transfoirmation curve Y-Y^.. They have lower future full earnings at
E (<E ), and are less well off at Q- on WW that those with higher
lifetime returns at n,.
FIGURE 3
There now have been hundreds of research studies of earnings func-
tions that develop ever-expanding evidence to the effect that improve-
ments in the quantity and quality of schooling significantly increase
earnings later (e.g., Windham (1979, pp. 1-31), Psacharopoulos (1972),
Appendix B to Ch. 5 below, etc.). Other factors that also contribute
to inequality in earnings are emphasized by the dual labor market
hypothesis and the screening hypothesis, although both sieze on factors
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that are correlated with and considerably overlap measures of the quan-
9
tity and quality of schooling. The radical approach also emphasizes
factors that overlap measures of education such as social class, that
reflects family income and which in turn is well known to be a key
determinant of the quality and number of years of education received.
There are some effects on earnings from things other than education of
course, including monopoly rents, screening, and chance events as sur-
veyed by Sahota (1978). Earnings inequality also is not the same as
income inequality since income includes rent, interest, profits, and
inheritance as additional major sources of property income inequality.
The point is that since the quantity and quality of education
affect earnings later in life, vertical equity decisions that seek to
achieve equity in the ultimate outcomes need to consider earnings and
non-monetary returns to education later in life. That is, the choice of
an equity principle discussed below for the treatment of children whose
parents are unequal and its effect on the intergenerational transmission
of inequality is an important dimension of all vertical equity criteria.
Fiscal neutrality now also can be interpreted as an intergenera-
tional equity concept, as was the equality of educational opportunity
above, in the sense that both seek to break the link between the
parent's wealth and the student's future. Neither, however, undertake to
correct for starting disadvantages that may come from limited learning
opportunities in the home and neighborhood experienced by the student.
Vertical Equity
Since the concept of" equal treatment of equals appears to be relati-
vely widely accepted, the choice of an equity principle narrows down to
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the choice of a principle to apply to intergenerational equity and to
vertical equity, which is concerned with the unequal treatment of
unequals. In the vertical equity hierarchy presented below, these prin-
ciples range all the way from commutative equity—which would leave
undisturbed the inequalities produced by inheritance and by markets—to
positivism which would be sharply redistributive to correct for initial
disadvantages
.
Goals such as equality of educational opportunity and fiscal
neutrality again lie somewhere between these two extremes. Empirically,
student equity at primary, secondary, and college levels tends to fall
somewhere between commutative equity and these middle level goals,
although undoubtedly examples could be cited of individual special edu-
cation programs that tend to be positivist and others that are com-
mutative in their orientation. One of the chapters in this book will
be found to tend somewhat more toward a commutative orientation
(Schultz), one toward a positivist (Alexander), and several toward the
middle level fiscal neutrality, equality of educational opportunity^ and
proportionality positions (e.g.. Due, Carroll, and Nelson).
On the tax side, this hierarchy is perhaps most closely analogous to
regressive, proportional, or progressive tax rates. Corresponding to
this, on the benefit side are regressive, proportional, or progressive
rates of benefit. The latter corresponds most directly to positivism in
equity as developed by the philosopher John Rawls (1977), since it
involves the effort to correct social wrongs borne by the child for
which he is not responsible.
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Operational measures of vertical equity among children are more
difficult to develop because it requires a difficult judgment about the
value of the benefit of education (or intensity of the need) among
children who are unequal. It is easier on the tax side where the
operational measure is merely the tax rate, when once the abillty-to-pay
has been measured properly as discussed above. The benefit-rate among
unequals can be approximated by calculating the percent of real current
expenditure spent per member of the special population, and asking
whether it is larger than, equal to, or less than the percent spent per
member of the regular student population. An equal percent would
correspond approximately to fiscal neutrality or to equal educational
opportunity, whereas a larger percent spent per pupil on the disadvan-
taged e^handicapped students would tend toward being a
progressive rate structure of the type required by a positivist equity
principle.
An Equity Criteria Hierarchy
Choice of an equity principle from the equity criteria hierarchy
that follows, and determining which is the highest and which the lowest
level, depends upon the philosophical and ethical views of the
community, sometimes as reflected through the courts. Given this, if
an improvement in equity can be made without a reduction in efficiency,
a contribution can be made to humane growth.
1. Commutative Equity . This first level of equity implies that the
state leaves undisturbed the results of the market place. In its most
extreme form, it leaves little room for public schools at the local
level, because tax supported schools do redistribute benefits among
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families. Most practical positions on comrautive equity would localize
school finance, rather than do away with public schools. Presumably
private scholarship funds would be used only to attract the most able
students and student need would not be considered. This laissez-faire
approach implies emphasis on pure competition and opposition to
monopoly, including steps to reduce both private and public monopolies,
allowing competition to eliminate the inefficient units. The problem
is that the commutative equity criterion allows unlimited differences
in wealth among parents to persist, unlimited differences in expen-
diture per child, and reduces but still permits considerable intergen-
erational transmission of inequality.
2. Fiscal Neutrality . At this second level of equity, the state
seeks to achieve a degree of equity through transfer pa5mients so that
local school districts, community colleges or individual students (in
the case of need-based education grants) are treated as though they had
access to an equivalent amount of wealth per student. After attainment
of an equal fiscal base (which seldom is attained under current
practices) unlimited variation in local effort would be permitted, as
would unlimited variation in expenditure per pupil. State school
finance systems generally go beyond commutative equity and part of the
distance toward fiscal neutrality. Similarly, the financing of higher
education goes beyond commutative equity through the use of grants and
aids based on need such as private scholarships, low interest loans,
work study, state scholarship commission grants, and Federal BEOG
grants. But higher education also falls short of fiscal neutrality,
for the income of parents is still an important determinant of the
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quantity and quality of the college education received. The achieve-
ment of fiscal neutrality should move the current system toward greater
horizontal equity, a higher level of vertical tax and student equity,
and toward less intergenerational transmission of inequality.
3. Proportionality . This requires equal effective tax rates in
relation to ability-to-pay, benefits that are proportional to need on
the expenditure side. Among students who are unequal, a clear defini-
tion of proportional vertical equity is more difficult because it is
hard to measure need from smallest to greatest. But it does imply a
larger percent of total expenditure per student spent on the disadvan-
taged students than on the regular students through special education
programs. This degree of rectification, however, presumably would not
preclude the more able from moving ahead more quickly, or completing
advanced degrees more frequently. This level of equity most closely
corresponds to equality of educational opportunity. It still allows
for differences in total expenditure based on differences in tastes
among families given that some are myopic and others are more far
sighted, as well as on differences in innate ability. This level would
severely reduce but not eliminate intergenerational transmission of in-
equality of earnings.
4. Positivism . The fourth-level equity criterion implies
progressive rates on both the tax and benefit sides. This is Rawlsian
equity, designed to have a corrective effect on the current income dis-
tribution, and to assist positively the least advantaged. It would
imply full financing by the state of high-cost programs for handicapped
or disadvantaged children, BEOG grants for the poor, and affirraitive
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action. Finally, this level of positivism also implies a correction
for those individual cases where parents and students have myopic
tastes. Hence positivism provides for intergenerational equity should
the parents' welfare function W^W in Figure 3 above be too short-
sighted and hence too close to the horizontal axis. This fourth and
final level of equity thereby implies elimination of the intergenera-
tional transmission of inequality, and attainment of intergenerational
distributive justice among peers.
Maximum Social Benefit
Finally, the "equal-sacrifice" equal-benefit doctrine with its long
tradition in public finance (e.g., Edgeworth, 1925, pp. lOOff), when the
common assumptions of diminishing marginal utility of income and of
benefit are made, is the economists' counterpart of Rawls' positivism.
It says that to minimize the aggregate sacrifice borne by taxpayers,
and to maximize the aggregate benefits from education received by
children, "equal sacrifice" logically has to be interpreted as equal
marginal sacrifice, and "equal benefit" similarly must be interpreted
as equal marginal benefit. To equalize real costs and real benefits at
the margin requires progressive tax and benefit rates—or positivism.
The courts have sometimes taken as a positivist stance, such as in
Levittown v. Nyquist (State Supreme Court of New York, 1978), and some-
times something less than that, as is developed further in Alexander's
chapter.
V. Humane Growth Criteria
The contributions of education and of academic research to humane
growth in the society include their contributions to full earnings and
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to non-monetary social benefits which are important to both national
growth and the quality of human life, as well as the contributions of
access through intergenerational equity and new knowledge
to distributive justice.
Efficiency and Equity As Joint Products
The challenge is to bring together efficiency criteria and equity
criteria, especially by locating the more limited situations where they
are joint products. The successively more comprehensive criteria for
efficiency, equity, and humane growth are listed below. Together
with the operational measures for most that have been discussed above,
they can be applied judgmentally by both small unit and larger area
administrators and educational planners without further measurement,
since further measurement is not always practical (especially at small
unit levels), by drawing on existing research studies.
An Efficiency Criteria Hierarchy An Equity Criteria Hierarchy
1. Accountability 1. Commutative Equity
2. Production Function Relationships 2. Fiscal Neutrality
3. Cost/Effectiveness Criteria 3. Proportional Equity
4. Cost/Monetary-Benefit Criteria 4. Positivism
5. Cost/"Full"-Earnings Criteria
6. Cost/ "Full "-Private-and-Social-
Benefit Criteria
Humane Growth Criteria
1. Improvements in efficiency, with no reduction
in equity.
2. Improvements in equity, with no reduction in
efficiency.
3. Improvements in both efficiency and equity.
Choice of one of these humane growth criteria for practical appli-
cation will limit policy changes quite severely to that area where
efficiency and equity are complementary. This is illustrated again in
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Figure 4 (from Figure 1) as the shaded area ZX'S^. To summarize,
starting at point Z, improvements in efficiency consistent with humane
growth criterion #1 above would limit budget changes to those above line
ZQ and to the right of line ZX so that neither A or B are made worse
off, (criterion #5 for Pareto efficiency). To avoid reducing equity,
however, the region is further limited under equity criterion #3
FIGURE 4
to the shaded area to the right of line ZX'. Using humane growth cri-
teria #2 above, improvements in equity would occur when moving to the
right from line ZX', but parallel to line ZQ to avoid reductions in
efficiency. A joint improvement in both equity and efficiency occurs in
any move upward from point Z and to the right of ZX'.
Efficiency and Equity Trade-Offs
To go beyond this gets into the delicate trade-off between ineffi-
ciency and equity. Starting with Atkinson's (1970) equality measure, he
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defines equality in such a way that the measure of inequality (in
contrast to the Gini coefficient) is specifically related to the Welfare
Function, WW in Figure 4. To simplify, if point Z' is the current
distribution of full lifetime earnings from education between A and B,
Atkinson would merely define equivalent earnings as any other point
along W^W^« Noting that these equivalent earnings are equally distri-
buted at point X*, and average actual benefit is approximately at Q,
then Atkinson's measure of inequality is:
(1) A=-^
That is, the distance SIX* measures the efficiency-loss in total benefits
from education due to the greater inequality and child inequity at
point Z'
.
This is a theoretical framework for widening the range of budget
decisions beyond those where there is a joint gain in efficiency and
equity. The humane growth criteria 1-3 conservatively limits the
region for planning, budgeting, and financing decisions to area ZSIX'
where little opposition can be expected because nobody is made worse
off—efficiency and equity are both increased. But opposition will
arise as budget decisions move into the trade-offs in region ZX'Z' where
there are gains in efficiency at the cost of increasing the existing
inequity, or into region ZQY where the students from the best neigh-
borhoods become the worse off.
An operational measure may now be obtained, however, for these
trade-offs between efficiency and equity. It requires Che choice of an
-39-
equity principle from the equity criteria hierarchy above, and a sub-
stitution of this choice into the equation given in footnote 13 that
gives the general shape and position of the welfare function W W^ in
Figure 4. The combination is a significant step, somewhat unique in
education, to obtain a measure of the cost of the inequity (at Z') in
terms of an efficiency loss (X*J^). If commutative equity is chosen,
W^W is flat, and the inequity that exists is valued at zero. A change
in the distribution of benefits shifting some expenditure per pupil
from group B toward group A would not result in any gain (change in
Wp^ = zero). If fiscal neutrality, or proportional equity (i.e.,
equality of educational opportunity) is chosen, W^W would be more con-
vex to the origin, and there would be a larger gain measured in effi-
ciency—terms (i.e., X*Q > 0) by changing the distribution of educa-
tional benefits among children from Z', where they are unequal, to J2,
where they are more equal. If positivism is chosen, there is an even
more convex welfare function in Figure 4 and a still larger welfare
gain (in efficiency terms) through redistributing the benefits to
13
correct for initial inequities.
These trade-offs still incur opposition on behalf of the group who
are made worse-off , so emphasizing the humane growth criteria wherever
14possible holds the greatest promise. The trade-offs between effi-
ciency and equity cannot be completely avoided, but in education there
are likely to be many more situations where improvements in equity
simultaneously increase efficiency (and vice versa) than is typical of
the rest of the economy. The reason is that among working age adults,
redistribution of earnings reduces work incentives. Among children.
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however, redistribution of educational benefits to achieve greater
equality of educational opportunity may actually increase the work
incentives of these young persons over their life cycles, without
reducing the preparation or work incentives for others. This is partly
because there is some evidence of diminishing returns in the high
expenditure-per-child school and college districts in the form of
smaller percentages of their budgets spent on instruction that is cited
by Carroll and ^yes.'^e . Most important, it is because as children from
low income neighborhoods benefit from better preparation, the incentive
effect is not negative as it is for welfare payments.
Conclusion
There are strong nationwide pressures to increase social efficiency
in the schools and colleges. These pressures come from the squeeze by
energy costs and inflation, from declining enrollments, and from slower
economic growth—all reflected in the political climate—and all
necessitating internal reallocation. If equity is to be maintained,
much less improved, it will be necessary to look more actively for
internal sources of funds.
The main efforts to improve efficiency must come at the local school
and college levels where the final allocative decisions are made
—
requiring clear incentives to achieve efficiency, and criteria that can
be applied informally and judgmentally. State and Federal levels have a
role—states can reduce the budgets for programs that are not cost-^
effective or socially efficient and increase the incentives for local
efficiency by avoiding cost-plus arrangements in the design of categori-
cal programs. State and Federal policies might facilitate competition
-41-
and more parental involvement as means of policing the system (and
getting homework done by students) where possible. But beyond this, it
is likely to be counterproductive if State and Federal levels require
too much paper work or intervene directly in the direct management of
schools and colleges.
In the effort to improve equity, there are also an important local
school board and college trustee and staff planning roles, especially
in moderating the strong effects within the local schools on the
quality of the schools of wealth disparities among neighborhoods. But
given the wide disparities in local wealth among districts, states, and
those seeking access to college, there is a necessary state and Federal
role. Again, however, equity criteria and measurements are required as
informal judgments are made about equity as a part of each decision.
It would be a mistake to underestimate the inefficiency, waste, and
inequity in the system. However, it should be clear that it is our
belief that the U.S. basically has good schools and good colleges—and
that what is needed is more and still better education, not poorer
quality, or reduced access. There are unnoticed sources of waste in
schools and colleges—ranging from temporarily unutilized cash balances
that are not drawing interest, underutilized classroom buildings,
underutilized staff as enrollments decline, protectionist admission
requirements in fields where there are inflationary pressures and
shortages, low secondary school requirements in mathematics and science,
higher drop out rates compared to Japan, the USSR, and other rapidly
growing nations, and high school graduates with insufficient basic
skills, to high levels of subsidy and low admission standards in
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fields where there are oversupplies. Inequity furthermore persists as
evidenced by the poor quality education found in urban ghettoes and the
unequal educational opportunities available to children in the poorest
neighborhoods and poorest states.
This chapter, finally, has sought to present an overview of the
state of the art with respect to the criteria currently available. The
operational measures for the "full" private-plus-social projected rates
of return are still not sufficiently comprehensive, and the selection
of an equity principle requires delicate ethical judgments to be made.
But these limitations are not sufficient for ignoring what does exist.
For some analysis and information can be quite informative, helping to
isolate the missing elements needed in each final judgment, and to make
what is already good, better. Such a combination of both efficiency
and equity considerations, and use of the humane growth criteria that
are suggested, have implications not only for better education, but for
the longer run welfare of society as a whole.
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Footnotes
*The author Is indebted to Terry G, Geske, Keith Hartley, Mark Blaug,
an anonymous referee, and Carolyn H. McMahon for helpful comments.
1. See Jay Chambers, pp. 95 and 101 in Windham, ed. (1979) for effects
of community income differences on teacher salaries and then the
positive relation between teacher salaries and teacher traits such
as years of schooling, years of experience, teacher education in
basic disciplines, and teacher verbal ability.
2. This Pareto criterion is the central criterion for efficiency moves
in welfare theory. The subsidiary Hicks-Kaldor compensation
principle allows for compensation to be provided to disadvantaged
parties (e.g., to college students whose program has been elimi-
nated by the state, or to a teacher whose teaching load has been
significantly increased). But "hold harmless" clauses reduce to
the more central Pareto criterion when the compensation is actually
paid (as it often is to facilitate the change) since after the
payment of compensation, no one is worse off. The broader defini-
tion of economic efficiency relative to Pareto efficiency which
includes trade-offs with equity is considered in Part "^ and in
Figure 4 below.
3. Technically, A and B are individuals throughout, but it will be
more interesting to think of them as representative of groups of
"poor" and "rich" children or young adults. Without assuming
additivity of utility, what is said for two individuals here is
easily generalizable to three or more.
4. Many persons in educational evaluation are concerned with situa-
tions where there are more than two educational outcomes (outputs),
and/or more than two inputs. We seek here to simplify the situa-
tion to its essentials however, and what is said here for two out-
comes (outputs) can be generalized to refer to three or more.
Generalizations are developed in Henderson and Quandt (1971, pp.
58-91), and a survey of recent work with educational production
functions is offered by L. Lau in Chapter 2 of Windham (1979) and
by E. Cohn (1979, Ch. 8).
5. The political pressures on public administrators to minimize the
tax costs, while simultaneously maintaining or increasing the
benefits, at the risk if this is not done of being replaced, provides
incentives in public institutions to be efficient. The point is
developed further in the literature on budget determination through
voting by Bowen (1948, p. 188), Downs (1957), and McMahon (1970, 1971).
6. A review of educational production functions which summarizes the
empirical evidence to date as well as providing an exposition of
their basic theoretical elements and the problems in their applica-
tion is provided by Lawrence J. Lau as Chapter 2 in D. Windham
(1979, pp. 33-70).
7. See evidence on the accuracy of expected earnings, in McMahon and
Wagner (1981), as well as on female response to these expectations
in Ferber and McMahon (1979), for example.
8. For some applications of horizontal equity measures, see Odden,
Berne, and Strefel (1979, pp. 13-84). The five least equitable
states by most of the measures reported are Virginia, New York,
Wyoming, Georgia, and Pennsylvania. Implications of the choice
among measures are considered by Berne (1978).
9. Evidence of a positive relationship between education, earnings,
and job performance is developed by Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974),
Wise (1975), and Wolpin (1977). The screening hypothesis (or
signalling argument) continues to be defended by Lazear (1977).
10. Specifically, one must assume that the marginal utility of each
dollar of income declines as income increases, and that the
marginal benefit of each dollar's worth of education provided to'
a child diminishes as the amount of education provided increases.
The latter is more debatable when students are being compared who
differ with respect to their parental incomes and ability. On
efficiency grounds, for example, the more able can learn more from
one additional year of education and expenditure than can the less
able students. But then, one additional dollar of income may mean
more to the less able students later in life.
11. The fact that the interpersonal comparisons of utility that are
involved rest on philosophical and ethical grounds, and not on
economic grounds, has been mentioned previously.
12. Wealthier tax-paying districts (neighborhoods) will not voluntarily
redistribute much to poor districts (neighborhoods) so that too
much decentralization of finance eliminates all redistribution.
13. The level of W.W in Figure 1 can be described by:
^^-> %4^a4^B ' 0< cc<l-
where y and y equals the real expenditure per pupil on A and B.A o
This then requires that an equity principle be chosen from among
those presented in the equity hierarchy above to specify the
alpha-weights. That is, if a = 1, social welfare is the simple
sum of the real expenditures for A and B. This would correspond
to commutative equity because the distribution of expenditure
between A and B makes no difference. As a = 0, W^ = log y. +
log y„, and a given number of dollars can accomplish a larger
o
proportional increase if used to benefit the student who is
currently worse-off . This advantage in the use of marginal
dollars would continue until benefits are equal, which means that
the logarithmic form corresponds to the equality of educational
opportunity equity criterion #2, Rawlsian positivism arises as
y and y are redefined as outcomes (e.g., lifetime full earnings)
or as a = - D, with increasing degrees of corrective action for
the disadvantaged. It then is possible to measure the cost of the
loss in equity from redistribution of the benefits using Eq. (2)
as the change in W when y increases and y decreases for com-
U B A
parison to the gains from the improvement in efficiency, to see
if there is a net gain.
14. It is not uncommon to seek near^consensus on changes, since then
the interpersonal comparisons of utility that are involved, and
the choice of an equity principle, do not have to be defended in
every situation.
I'tnn •>•• a.
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